A Special Series: America's Special Providence
Analyzing the Schools American Foreign Policy and Where we go From Here
America, by virtue and curse of being a world power, is beset by many condescending stereotypes from the insistence that we have no culture to typically being a “loud people” (to which I retort by pointing to European bars every time their football team scores). Yet one stereotype that’s thrown around occasionally among elite circles is that American foreign policy tradition is unrefined and is a result of lacking a meaningful foreign policy tradition until the Second World War. One can point the stereotype’s origin to Lord Bryce, Britain's ambassador to the United States from 1907 to 1913, who wrote that the role of foreign policy in American life could be described the way travelers described snakes in Ireland: "There are no snakes in Ireland." Americans seem to confirm this stereotype as they are very unaware of their nation’s foreign policy history, especially among diplomatic elites. Because of this lack of foreign policy roots, our country has veered into countless errors and only skirted disaster due to, as Bismarck remarked, “the Special Providence that exists among fools, drunkards, and the United States.”
While this stereotype sounds true, it is very much inaccurate, whose prevalence is due to the fault of an intellectual elite more prone to historical clichés than reality. In contrast, American foreign policy is as old as our Declaration of Independence from Silas Deane’s voyage to France as the Continental Congress’ representative to our current engagement on the world stage. Several books about our foreign policy history have been written (including one recent tome by Robert Zoellick that is worth a buy). Yet few have surpassed Walter Russel Mead’s Special Providence in describing the foreign policy traditions that have existed within America. Throughout his book, Mead dispels the notion that American foreign policy doesn’t exist in American life showing how our diplomats, soldiers, and occasional scoundrels, shaped our country for the better (and for worse). Guiding these men are four political traditions which were present at some level since our founding: the internationalist Wilsonians (though Thomas Paine was its spiritual founder), the mercantilist Hamiltonians, the idealistic Jeffersonians, and the nationalist Jacksonians. All four of these traditions came into being through different interpretations of America’s foundation and which have separate philosophies, interests, and even demographic leanings. These traditions have at one point dominated American foreign policy thinking (with the possible exception of Jeffersonianism) which can be a cacophony for foreigners and therefore contributing to this stereotype.
There are many legitimate criticisms of American foreign policy, but a very valid one can be how our foreign policy can constantly change with each administration. This is certainly true with the Trump administration as he upended the status quo that generally guided American foreign policy for decades. Yet such rapid changes in foreign policy should be expected with a republic whose governance depends on the consent of the governed. Mead notes that American foreign policy can appear contradictory and unorthodox compared to the European practices of realism but these seeming contradictions come from various interests and institutions whose influence changes by administration or political eras. With four schools of diplomatic thought, each supported by different interests whose influence constantly shifts, the United States must accommodate and deal with these differing schools when conducting foreign policy. This would be a recipe for disaster in any other scenario, yet the United States uses what would typically be seen as a weakness into a strength moderating the push and pull of various traditions as needed allowing our political trajectory to remain upward. Granted, we can argue that this moderation has weakened in recent years, yet our diplomatic heritage has allowed us to both preserve our interests and spread our values internationally.
Almost 20 years later, the book remains prescient today in understanding the history of American foreign policy, even though some of its premises and conclusions are now very dated. Unfortunately, the golden era where this book was written is now long gone as the US faces threats at home and abroad. American supremacy is no longer for granted as the once-sleeping dragon that Napoleon feared is awake shaking the world as we speak. American blood was shed in two countries with limited impact beyond showing our impotence on the global stage. But what makes these issues worse is that our foreign policy elite appears incapable of shaping and executing any coherent policy, not to mention their poor stewardship of American power since the end of the Cold War. The Wilsonian school, which guided the United States with almost no interruption since 1941, is being discredited in both the eyes of the world and the American people leaving us with a question on how American foreign policy should be conducted going forward.
Fortunately, there is a proliferation of new thinkers that seek to build a better foreign policy consensus as we can see with the rise of Jeffersonians, Jacksonians and Hamiltonians in the foreign policy community. While they have many distinctions, there remains a slew of similarities and differences between the four schools and its adherents that causes strange bedfellows at times. For instance, Hamiltonians may work with Wilsonians to advance a strategy that emphasizes global engagement while at the same time collaborate with Jacksonians to build a more conservative orientation to American foreign policy. But within these schools comes a desire to establish a foreign policy order that shapes American diplomatic thought and strategy for generations to come. As we are transitioning to a new diplomatic consensus, I believe it is time to do a special series on this topic which I’m calling Special Providence Revisited: The Four Schools of American Foreign Policy.
This special series will be focusing on the future of American foreign policy and how should we conduct our business with the outside world. I think doing this special series should accomplish two objectives: first, we must understand the four schools of American foreign policy and its role in American history. All four schools have had an influence in our development whether they were shaping official doctrine or stirring the masses. It would be foolish for us to set any new grand strategy without understanding the constraints and benefits each school provides. But as a conservative, I should admit my second objective: to advance the case for a Hamiltonian realism that would best preserve American interests abroad while keeping us in a position where we can even seep our values into the global community. It is a series that will expand Mead’s thesis but refine it with the newfound knowledge we’ve gained since 2001. I have no ambitious desire to write a book that supplants Mead, but I want to apply Mead’s work - and many others - in both understanding our diplomatic schools and to establish the case for a new conventional order within Washington that would further conservative objectives and values.
I intend on publishing on each school every Saturday going forward, where we will uncover its basic premise, its advantages and disadvantages before I provide the opinion you all crave. If applicable, I’ll see if I can highlight specific leaders in each of these schools though this may be complicated as few thinkers are purely within one camp or the other. I will start with the dominant Wilsonian school moving counterclockwise in my matrix above ending with the Hamiltonian school. This will be more of a challenge than what I did with the presidential special series so I hope all can find some insights from Special Providence Revisited (though I know some of you will be shaking your head in some parts).